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Deconstruction and Philosophy in Translation: The Franco-German Connection 
Michael Syrotinski, University of Glasgow 
 
In 1988 there was a conference in Heidelberg on the philosophical and political dimension of 
Heidegger’s thought, with contributions from Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida and 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. This article considers a number of interchanges between French 
and German philosophers in the late twentieth century, focusing on the theme of translation. 
Taking Derrida’s intervention as a starting point, the article moves on to explore Victor 
Klemperer’s analysis of the German language under Nazism, Derrida and Maurice Blanchot 
as readers of Heidegger, Paul de Man and Derrida’s interpretations of Walter Benjamin’s 
‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, in the context of the post-war French reception of German 
thought. The article concludes with a discussion of ‘untranslatability’, as developed by the 
Greek philologist and philosopher, Barbara Cassin, in her Dictionary of Untranslatables 
(2014), taking the history of the concept and word ‘subject’ as a way of reflecting on 
Europe’s identity, past, present and future. 
 
Keywords: Derrida, Gadamer, Heidegger, Benjamin, Barbara Cassin, Deconstruction, 
Philosophy in translation, Europe. 
 
 
One of the more intriguing but relatively neglected events in the recent history of Franco-
German philosophical relations took place in 1988 at a conference in Heidelberg — held 
entirely in French — on Heidegger, more precisely, on ‘la portée philosophique et politique 
de sa pensée’ (the philosophical and political dimension of his thought). This gathering 
brought together three of Heidegger’s most attentive readers and commentators: Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Jacques Derrida and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. It followed on from an earlier 
conference in Paris in 1981 which brought Gadamer and Derrida face to face for the first 
time, at which Gadamer spoke in German. That meeting highlighted the lines of difference 
between Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as it applies to language and aesthetics, 
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deeply influenced by the dialectical approach he had learned from Heidegger, and Derrida’s 
deconstructive critique of the ‘logocentrism’ which for him was at the heart of the entire 
Western metaphysical tradition, and from which he did not exempt Heidegger.1 In contrast, 
Gadamer, who had admired Derrida’s reading of Husserl in Voice and Phenomenon, argued 
that Heidegger’s thought was important precisely because it identified logocentrism as ‘le 
destin de l’Occident’ (the West’s destiny).2 Gadamer’s own hermeneutic method emphasized 
the importance of dialogue, communication, and shared understanding. As he puts it, 
‘l’herméneutique qui fonde ma réflexion insiste sur la communication et s’intéresse moins 
aux sous-entendus des mots et du discours’ (the hermeneutics which is the basis of my 
reflection emphasizes communication, and is less interested in the hidden meanings of words 
and discourse, CH, 47). As in the 1981 conference in Paris, it was evident that any attempt to 
arrange a critical dialogue ‘between’ hermeneutics and deconstruction would always run up 
against a fundamentally different approach to the place that language and communication 
have in contemporary philosophy, aesthetics, and politics, and that this would be crystallized 
in Gadamer’s and Derrida’s competing readings of Heidegger.3  
                                                          
1 Terry Eagleton defines ‘logocentric’ as the belief ‘that discourses can yield us immediate 
access to the full truth and presence of things.’ Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, 
2nd edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 164. 
2 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, La Conférence de 
Heidelberg (1988). Heidegger: Portée Philosophique et politique de sa pensée, présentation 
de Mireille Caille-Gruber, note de Jean-Luc Nancy (Abbaye d’Ardenne: Lignes/IMEC, 
2014), p. 47. Subsquently abbreviated to CH, with page references immediately following 
quotation in parentheses. 
3 For an interesting reflection on their two ‘encounters’ in 1981 and 1988, see Gadamer’s 
interview with Carsten Dutt in Gadamer in Conversation: Reflections and Commentary, ed. 
and trans. by Richard E. Palmer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 61–77. 
Gadamer states bluntly that ‘Derrida’s incapacity for dialogue was once again manifest. 
Dialogue is not his strength’ (p. 62). I have retained Derrida’s and Gadamer’s French original 
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The 1988 event was held in the same amphitheatre of the University of Heidelberg 
where Heidegger had delivered a lecture on ‘Die Rolle der Universität im neuen Reich’ in 
1933, echoing what would become his infamous ‘Rektoratsrede’ as newly appointed Rector 
of the University of Freiburg. The 1988 debate was held a year after the publication of Victor 
Farias’s controversial book on Heidegger’s links with National Socialism, Heidegger et le 
nazisme.4 There was also controversy about Paul de Man and Maurice Blanchot, whose work 
was influenced by Heideggerian thought, and whose early anti-Semitic journalism was seen 
by many to discredit their later writings.5 The gathering of 1988 was a notable instance in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(with my English translation) from the 1988 conference in order to respect Gadamer’s own 
set of ground rules in organizing the event, which is that the language of presentation and 
debate should be French, in spite of the confessed limitations of his own French. This was a 
conscious act of reciprocal linguistic hospitality, since in the previous meeting at the Goethe 
Institute in Paris, Gadamer spoke in German.  
4 Victor Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme (Paris: Verdier, 1987). English edition: Heidegger 
and Nazism, ed. by Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore, trans. by Paul Burrell and Gabriel 
Ricci (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).  
5 Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe have each written at length on Heidegger. See Jacques 
Derrida, De l’esprit: Heidegger et la question (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1987). English 
translation by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the 
Question (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), in which he allies Heidegger’s 
political crisis to a crisis ‘of the mind’ (l’esprit), a theme he takes up in L’autre cap (Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1991). English: The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, 
trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1992). For Lacoue-Labarthe, see Heidegger, Art, and Politics: The Fiction of the 
Political, trans. by Chris Turner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). Lacoue-Labarthe and his 
collaborator Jean-Luc Nancy were also both importers of German idealist philosophy into 
French theory. The literature on Paul de Man and Maurice Blanchot is too extensive to go 
into here, but see, for example, Responses: On Paul de Man’s Wartime Journalism, ed. by 
Werner Hamacher, Neil Hertz and Thomas Keenan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1988), and Lignes 43, ‘Les vies politiques de Maurice Blanchot 1930–1993’ (2014). 
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French ‘translation’ and reception of German thought which has shaped contemporary 
European philosophy since World War II. This article takes the encounter between Gadamer 
and Derrida as the point of departure for consideration of language and translation. It 
examines Derrida’s interpretation of Heidegger as an example, and extension, of the 
‘untranslatables’ project developed by the Greek philologist and philosopher, Barbara Cassin, 
in her Vocabulaire européen des philosophies (2004), translated into English recently as the 
Dictionary of Untranslatables (2014).6 Cassin is by no means an incidental character in this 
sweeping narrative, since as a student in her early twenties she was invited to participate in 
one of Heidegger’s small, private seminars hosted by the French poet René Char, in Le Thor, 
in the south of France in 1969.7 As well as being an authoritative commentator of Greek 
philosophy, and in particular the Sophists, it was Cassin’s subsequent work as a translator of 
Hannah Arendt (a student of Heidegger) into French which drew her to the importance of 
translation, and the inexhaustibly productive energy of what she termed ‘the untranslatable’, 
within the history of European philosophy. This article concludes with a look at Cassin’s 
discussion of the word ‘Subject’, and arguing that the question of the European subject as a 
philosophical subject has implications for how we understand the European project in 
general. 
                                                          
6 Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, ed. by Barbara Cassin, Emily 
Apter, Jacques Lezra and Michael Wood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 
xvii. Original French text: Barbara Cassin (ed.), Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: 
Dictionnaire des intraduisibles (Paris: Seuil, 2004). Further references to the English edition 
of the Vocabulaire will appear in the text abbreviated as DU.  
7 For a comprehensive account of Heidegger’s influence on post-war French intellectual 
thought, see Dominique Janicaud, Heidegger in France, trans. by François Raffoul and David 
Pettigrew (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2015). See also David Pettigrew 
and François Raffoul (eds.), French Interpretations of Heidegger: An Exceptional Reception 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2008). 
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At the 1988 Heidelberg conference, Gadamer, Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, each 
with differing emphases, observed the need to confront squarely Heidegger’s unquestionable 
relationship with National Socialism, and the nature of his anti-Semitism, but at the same 
time they also stressed the need to engage with the intellectual challenge that Heidegger’s 
philosophical thinking represents. Derrida spends a considerable amount of time during the 
discussion nuancing, one might even say finessing, Gadamer’s account of Heidegger’s 
‘deconstructive’ method, in particular around the notion of logos, and logocentrism, to which 
I will return. Gadamer takes Heidegger’s methodologically systematic critique, what he terms 
Abbau or Destruktion, of Kantian transcendental idealism, and his return to the hidden truth 
of Greek Pre-Socratic philosophy, as being consistent with an affirmation of logos. A 
considerable part of the seminar is spent trying to suggest that this is not fundamentally 
dissimilar from Derrida’s deconstructive approach. Derrida is, as ever, vigilant about the 
dangers of resolving difference via hermeneutic dialogue. One of the points he makes, in 
response to Farias’s book, and the hostile contemporary reactions to its revelations about 
Heidegger’s political sympathies, is the risk of falling into precisely the kind of reductive, 
totalising, not to mention totalitarian, thinking which it claims to discredit. As he says: ‘Je 
soutiens que, dans un champ de problèmes aussi graves, tout geste qui procède par 
amalgame, totalisation précipitée, court-circuit d’argumentation, simplification d’énoncés, 
etc., est un geste politiquement très grave qui rappelle, selon des formules de dénégation qui 
mériteraient le détour de l’analyse, cela même contre quoi nous sommes censés oeuvrer’ (I 
would maintain that, when we are dealing with such serious problems, any gesture which 
develops through a process of amalgamation, or hurried totalisation, or by short-circuiting 
arguments, or simplifying statements, and so on, is a very serious political gesture that 
echoes, using certain formulations of denial which it would be worth taking the time to 
analyse in greater detail, the thing itself against which we are supposedly working, CH, 58).  
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Derrida takes a similar tack in a text that comes a few years after the Heidelberg 
conference, L’autre cap (The Other Heading), first published in French in 1991, in response 
to the seismic shifts in Europe taking place in relation to the reunification of Germany and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Amidst the political discussions about a ‘new Europe’, Derrida 
argues that any opening up of Europe and its identity, and any discussion of old and new 
orders, always runs the risk of returning to what is in fact a very old rhetoric of ‘the new 
Europe’, one which was of course appropriated most brutally and uncompromisingly by the 
Nazi party in the 1930s, and which clearly had a powerful fascination for many other nations 
across Europe. Indeed, the questions Derrida poses at this point in European history ring with 
a terrible prescience as Europe again, today, is in the grip of perhaps an even more profound 
identity crisis, and uncertain future: ‘Is there a completely new “today” of Europe, a “today” 
whose novelty would not resemble — especially not — what was called by another well-
known program, and one of the most sinister , a “New Europe”? […] beyond all of the 
exhausted programs of Eurocentrism and Anti-Eurocentrism, these exhausting yet 
unforgettable programs?’8 For Derrida, the question of Heidegger’s political responsibility 
becomes a broader question of intellectual responsibility, and the meaning of ‘responsibility’ 
itself, a theme he will also develop at length in his own ‘response’ to the Paul de Man affair.9   
Unlike Gadamer, Derrida was fascinated by the hidden meanings of words, and the 
effects on philosophical thinking of intralingual and interlingual translation. The Other 
Heading discusses Paul Valéry’s meditations on Europe’s intellectual crisis between the 
wars, and the threat this posed to its status as the cultural capital of the world. Derrida 
advances his argument not by a process of hermeneutic dialectics, but through a subtle series 
of plays on the polysemy of ‘capital’, and its associated terms (cape, captain, caput and so on, 
                                                          
8 Derrida, L’autre cap, p. 18; The Other Heading, p. 12. 
9 Jacques Derrida, ‘Like the Sound of a Shell Deep Within the Sea: Paul de Man’s War’, 
trans. by Peggy Kamuf, Critical Inquiry, 14 (1988), 590–652. 
7 
 
for which terms revolving around head, heading, and so on in English generate a good but not 
quite equivalent semantic family). Derrida is turning hermeneutic method on its head here, 
reversing the direction or priority between meaning and language. The question of Europe 
and its future could be formulated as a question of the possibility or impossibility of 
translation itself; indeed, the notion of idioms, national or otherwise, and of translation is 
what he terms an ‘enjeu critique’ (‘what is critically at stake’). As Derrida puts it: 
 
The word ‘capital’ is a Latin word. The semantic accumulation that we are now 
highlighting organizes a polysemy around the central reserve, itself a capital reserve, 
or an idiom. By giving cause to remark upon this language […] we are focusing 
attention upon the critical stakes: the question of idioms and translation. What 
philosophy of translation will dominate in Europe? In a Europe that from now on 
should avoid both the nationalistic tensions of linguistic difference and the violent 
homogenization of languages through the neutrality of a translating medium that 
would claim to be transparent, metalinguistic, and universal? 10  
 
This is the point of departure for Barbara Cassin’s Untranslatables project, which places 
translation at the heart of a new way of thinking and reflecting on European philosophy, in 
order to navigate what she identifies as the twin pitfalls of articulating a history of 
philosophical language in translation: on the one hand, logical universalism (in the analytic 
tradition) which ignores languages, and on the other, the inherent essentialism of linguistic or 
philosophical nationalism. The Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des 
intraduisibles was originally published in French in 2004 by Robert/Editions du Seuil, as an 
encyclopaedic dictionary of close to four hundred philosophical, literary, and political terms. 
                                                          
10 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 58. 
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The entries for each term describe its origins and meanings, its translations into other 
languages, and the history and context of its usages through illustrative commentary of well-
known philosophical and literary texts. The terms — such as Dasein (German), logos 
(Greek), pravda (Russian), saudade (Portuguese), or stato (Italian) — come from over a 
dozen languages, spanning the classical, medieval, early modern, modern, and contemporary 
periods, and the entries are written by more than one hundred and fifty European 
philosophers and scholars. These are all terms which have had a profound influence on 
thinking across the humanities. The Vocabulaire is thus a volume unlike any other in the 
history of philosophy, in that it considers concepts not just as words, but words that enter into 
all sorts of problematic exchanges with other words in other languages, in a kind of vast 
multilingual performance that Cassin calls ‘philosopher en langues’ (‘philosophising in 
languages’, with the accent emphatically on the plural). The dictionary also includes 
historical surveys of the major modern European languages: English, French, German, Greek, 
Italian, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish.  
Cassin herself provides a useful shorthand definition of ‘untranslatable’ in her 
preface:  
 
To speak of untranslatables in no way implies that the terms in question, or the 
expressions, the syntactical or grammatical turns, are not and cannot be translated: 
the untranslatable is rather what one keeps on (not) translating [l’intraduisible, 
c’est plutôt ce qu’on ne cesse pas de (ne pas) traduire]. But this indicates that 
their translation, into one language or another, creates a problem, to the extent of 
sometimes generating a neologism or imposing a new meaning on an old word. 
(DU, xvii)   
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Clearly, of course, translation takes place, and has taken place, often very successfully, as 
shown by the many linguistic histories that are narrated with such extraordinary philological 
erudition and attention to detail, but also by the fact that the Vocabulaire itself is now being 
gradually translated into a dozen other language editions, most notably the 2014 Anglo-
American one published by Princeton University Press as the Dictionary of Untranslatables: 
A Philosophical Lexicon. The Dictionary, and its many translations, are thus a very deliberate 
counter-gesture to the intellectual impoverishment of ‘violent homogenisation’, whether 
through linguistic nationalism, or the suppression of linguistic difference, the effects of which 
she traces in many contexts.  
Take an apparently harmless word like ‘organization’, for example. This is one of the 
terms analysed by Victor Klemperer in LTI: Lingua Tertii Imperii.11 Klemperer, a professor 
of French literature at the University of Dresden who was removed from his post in 1935, 
kept a clandestine journal that helped him to live between 1933 and 1945. Like Arendt and 
Celan, he was acutely aware of the way in which Nazism infiltrated and poisoned the German 
language. As he says: ‘Worte können sein wie winzige Arsendosen: sie werden unbemerkt 
verschluckt, sie scheinen keine Wirkung zu tun, und nach einiger Zeit ist die Giftwirkung 
doch da’ (LTI, 24). This is why, according to Klemperer: ‘Man sollte viele Worte des 
nazistischen Sprachgebrauchs für lange Zeit, und einige für immer, ins Massengrab legen’ 
(LTI, 25). For Klemperer, ‘organisieren’ was one of those words. 
In chapter 17 of his book, ‘System und Organisation,’ Klemperer explains why 
Nazism preferred ‘Organisation’ to ‘System’:  
 
                                                          
11 Victor Klemperer, LTI: Notizbuch eines Philologen (1947) (Frankfurt a.M.: Röderberg, 
1975). Subsequent references are abbreviated to LTI and immediately follow quotations in 
parentheses. 
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Ein System ist etwas ‘Zusammengestelltes’, eine Konstruktion, ein Bau, den Hände 
und Werkzeuge nach Anordnung des Verstandes ausführen. […] Wenn aber ‘System’ 
verpönt ist, wie nennt sich dann das Regierungssystem der Nazis selber? Denn ein 
System haben doch auch sie und sind ja stolz darauf, daß absolut jede 
Lebensäußerung und -situation von diesem Netz erfast wird; weswegen denn 
‘Totalität’ zu den Grundpfeilern der LTI gehört.  
Sie haben kein System, sie haben eine Organisation, sie systematisieren nicht mit dem 
Verstande, sie lauschen dem Organischen seine Geheimnisse ab. (LTI, 119–20)  
 
Klemperer shows, with diminishing powers of resistance, how the allusion of linguistic 
naturalization gradually takes hold:  
 
Schon 1936 sagte mir ein junger Autoschlosser, der ganz allein mit einer kniffligen 
Notreparatur an meinem Vergaser zu Rande gekommen war: ‘Habe ich das nicht fein 
organisiert?’ [...] ‘organisieren’ war ein gutartiges, überall in Schwang befindliches 
Wort, war die selbstverständliche Bezeichnung eines selbstverständlich gewordenen 
Tuns... Ich schreibe nun schon eine ganze Weile: es war... es war. Aber wer hat denn 
gestern erst gesagt: ‘Ich muß mir ein bißchen Tabak organisieren?’ Ich fürchte, das 
bin ich selber gewesen. (LTI, 123–24). 
 
The point Cassin is making, using Klemperer as an example, is the ease with which 
ideologically loaded meanings can quickly become naturalized, not to say nationalized. One 
might assume that philosophy could function as a meta-physical and meta-temporal guarantor 
and guardian of meaning, and that there are core terms which have ‘stood the test of time’, 
despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that such consensually agreed meanings have been 
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hard-fought and hard-won over the last few centuries. Take the term ‘Subject’, which not 
surprisingly produces a lengthy entry in the Dictionary of Untranslatables (DU, 1069–90). 
Like many of the longer entries in the Dictionary of Untranslatables, it is the work of several 
hands, or minds: Etienne Balibar, Barbara Cassin, and Alain de Libera, with Cassin covering 
the Greek period. As she explains, in ancient Greece, where the story begins, there was no 
single term corresponding to the three semantic fields covered by sujet in French (or subject 
in English). The Greek word hupokeimenon was originally, in Aristotelian philosophy, both a 
physical subject (whether in the classical distinction between substance/essence and accident, 
or between matter and form) as well as the logical subject, understood as the support of 
predicates, that which is predicable (and this is equally true of logical and well as 
grammatical propositions). Hupokeimenon thus conveys the sense of a material subject, and a 
logical subject. Philosophically, the question of the essence of truth implies the idea of a 
subject, understood as a kind of unchanging support, basis, foundation, or suppositum (to 
which hupokeimenon is closely linked). The determining moment in the emergence of 
modern philosophical, political, and psychological concepts of the subject and subjectivity 
comes with the translation of hypokeimenon into Latin, as subjectum. As those familiar with 
Heidegger’s philosophy know, this translation from Greek to Latin is a crucial moment, 
indeed the event, in his rethinking of the Western metaphysical tradition. According to his 
analysis in his 1942–1943 Parmenides lectures, the Latinisation of Greek thinking is the 
event in which ‘the essence of truth originally assigns itself, and transmits itself, to beings’, 
and involves a fundamental shift from one régime of signification to another. The weightiest 
burden of proof in Heidegger’s account falls on the translation of aletheia as veritas (and its 
associated links to a whole range of other philosophical terms, such as ratio, and 
adaequatio).12  
                                                          
12 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz 
12 
 
According to Heidegger, there is a connection between the Latinisation of Greek 
thinking, and imperium.13 For him this event of translation precedes shapes the new order. 
The Latinisation of Greek opens the way for imperial expansion, along with its political self-
justification in all its forms, from Christianity onwards.14 So the imperium folded within 
subjection in a sense accompanies the transformation of aletheia into veritas, of 
hupokeimenon into subjectum, and for Heidegger the founding historical, epochal event is a 
forgetting of being, which ‘seals’ henceforth the question of truth as one of correctness (as 
opposed to falseness), or adaequatio. At the same time it initiates the covering over of this 
event by Western philosophers.  
There are then, as Cassin, Balibar, and Libera note, two related etymological strands, 
which become confused and intertwined over time: that of subject as subjectivity (derived 
from subjectum in Latin, and which sets itself against the object and objectivity); and that of 
subject implying an idea of subjugation or dependency (derived from subjectus or subditus in 
Latin: subjection, sujétion, or assujetissement). This latter strand opens up an entire juridical 
and political lineage, starting with Imperial and Christian Rome, which is extended through 
to the French Revolution, once the question of the subject is transformed politically into the 
question of citizenship. For the Heidegger of Being and Time, Descartes inaugurates the 
modern philosophical concept of the subject (that is, the moment when the subject becomes 
an active, thinking subject, insofar as it perceives itself as subject), and the Cartesian ‘je 
pense, donc je suis’ — which Heidegger rephrases as ‘I think myself thinking’, cogito me 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Bloomington, NI: University of Indiana Press, 2009), p. 41. 
13 See Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 40: ‘The realm of essence decisive for the development of 
the Latin falsum is the one of the imperium and of the “imperial”’. 
14 The religious aspect is essential. Derrida in Foi et Savoir coins the term 
‘mondialatinisation’ (translated as ‘globalatinisation’) to underline the inseparability of 
Christianity and Western imperial and epistemic dominance. See Foi et savoir (Paris: Seuil, 
2000), p. 48. 
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cogitare — is the invention of the transcendental subject. Heidegger thinks that Kant’s 
emphasis on Descartes, and the Cartesian cogito in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
subsequently determines Western philosophical thinking of the subject as a question of ‘self-
constitution’. From this point on the two genealogies of the subject (the logico-grammatical 
one, in which ontology and transcendental metaphysics are rooted, and the juridical, political, 
and theological one, that is subjectum and subjectus), are in effect, as Cassin, Balibar and 
Libera suggest, pulled together and become inseparable. Kant’s thought thus prefigures not 
only the Hegelian dialectics of self-consciousness, but also most modern concepts of 
subjectivity, ego psychology, and all of their subsequent transformations. It also means that 
the question of the subject is marked by the tension between theories of subjectivity 
(subjectum), and theories of subjection (subjectus), through what Cassin, Balibar and Libera 
term a ‘historial pun’ (DU, 1087), an unintentional linguistic confusion that is not so much 
historical as historial, or epochal.  
However one takes Kant’s and then Heidegger’s assigning such an inaugural role to 
Descartes in the history of the modern subject (and as the Vocabulaire says it is 
‘contestable’), there is an unquestionably French dimension to this history, which it assumes 
with Rousseau, who plays a key role, and who becomes the point of departure for much of 
the critical reflection on the subject in the twentieth century. The most astonishing fact, or 
event, though, is that this happens as a linguistic play on words. History in effect becomes 
subjected to etymology, but then much of the force of Heidegger’s philosophy comes 
precisely from the etymological privilege and poetic power it accords to the German 
language. This turn to etymologism does not go unnoticed by Maurice Blanchot, who follows 
14 
 
through its philosophical implications in The Writing of the Disaster.15 Blanchot wonders 
what is at stake in Heidegger’s etymological return to pre-Socratic Greek philosophy. He 
describes the faith placed in etymologism as an epistemological method more generally as 
follows: ‘Learned etymology is very, or not very different from so-called popular 
etymologies – etymologies by affinity and no longer solely by filiation. It is a statistically 
probable science, dependent not only upon philological research that is never complete, but 
also upon the particular tropes of language that at certain periods come to dominate 
implicitly’ (WD, 93–94). A little later on, commenting at length on the translation of logos as 
a-letheia in Heidegger’s philosophy, Blanchot describes one other danger of etymology, 
which is that it imposes ‘a certain conception of history’ (WD, 97). As he goes on to say: 
‘This conception is far from clear: the necessity of some provenance, of successive 
continuity, the logic of homogeneity, the revelation of sheer chance as destiny’ (WD, 97). 
One of the core terms for Heidegger in his philosophical etymologism, as Blanchot points 
out, and indeed another major term in the Dictionary of Untranslatables, is of course logos.  
This is also one of the main early targets and objects of Derrida’s reading of 
Heidegger in Of Grammatology.16 One might say that Derrida was wrestling with a similar 
question to the one the authors of the history of logos in translation had to confront (DU, 
581–93), namely: is it possible to step back from, or step outside, the history of logos, and 
can one do so without repeatedly (and inevitably) falling back into the logocentrism which 
                                                          
15 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster (1980), trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 94. Subsequently abbreviated to WD, with page 
references immediately following quotation. 
16 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, revised trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). Originally published in French as De la 
grammatologie (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967). 
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has been the unquestioned foundation of Western metaphysics?17 Derrida’s response to this 
question was clearly profoundly indebted to Heidegger’s engagement with Husserlian 
phenomenology, and as Derrida himself pointed out, Of Grammatology was indissociable 
from his own early reading of Husserl. In this respect, Of Grammatology was perhaps the key 
text of the post-war reception of Heidegger in France, and offered ‘grammatology’ as the 
‘science of writing’ that would tease apart the conceptual structures and underlying 
logocentric assumptions of all the other ‘-ologies’ Derrida brings into play: metaphysical 
ontology, medieval theology, — as well as his neologism connoting their common ground, 
‘metaphysico-theology’ — anthropology, semiology, and historical genealogy. Derrida 
argues that each of these various epistemologies belong to a genealogical chain that is 
traceable back to logos. He regards the semiological distinction between signified and 
signifier, as well as the presumed priority of the former over the latter, as the most recent 
manifestation and consolidation of such assumptions. In Of Grammatology he deconstructs 
the claims upon which these epistemological systems are founded, by showing how each 
system of knowledge cannot avoid having at its very origin the very term it has located as a 
secondary, supplemental derivation (e.g., writing) of that origin (e.g., voice). If Heidegger 
takes us back to logos through a similar historical genealogy of Western metaphysics, his 
poeticizing method relies on an intimate attention to etymology, understood as the story of 
the slow erosion over time of its original meaning. Heidegger’s intent is not, of course, to 
give us a more ‘truthful’ account of logos, but rather to rethink the very idea of ‘truth’ in its 
historical alignment with logos, thereby bringing to light, or uncovering the truth (a-letheia) 
of the Being of phenomenology.  
                                                          
17 This is another multiply authored entry, with Barbara Cassin again lead author, in 
collaboration with Clara Auvray-Assayas, Frédérique Ildefonse, Jean Lallot, Sandra Laugier, 
and Sophie Roesch. 
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 One might object that Derrida’s own etymological tracing of logos as ‘presence’ and 
‘speech’ is itself a semantic homogenization, indeed totalization. As the entry logos in the 
Vocabulaire européen des philosophies tells us, it is in fact an extraordinarily polysemic and 
‘disseminated’ term: a non-exhaustive list of meanings would include ‘discourse’, ‘language’, 
‘speech’, ‘rationality’, ‘reason’, ‘reasoning’, ‘intelligence’, ‘foundation’, ‘principle’, 
‘proportion’, ‘count’, ‘account’, ‘recount’, ‘thesis’, ‘tell’, ‘tale’, ‘tally’, ‘argument’, 
‘explanation’, ‘statement’, ‘proposition’, ‘phrase’, ‘definition’ (DU, 581). This in itself does 
not of course invalidate Heidegger’s ontological emphasis, or Derrida’s point that logos is 
associated with speech, but rather lends weight to their respective arguments. In both cases, 
the point they are making is that the gathering together (one of the core meanings of the 
Greek legein from which logos is derived) into one term of this infinitely scattered series of 
meanings is the very operation of logos. In this sense, the Dictionary of Untranslatables, and 
its confrontation of philosophy with untranslatability, could be read as a ‘Derridean project’ 
to the extent that his deconstructive reworking of Heidegger’s ontological rethinking of 
phenomenology, his re-invention of grammatology as a ‘writing science’ (along with all the 
other neologisms he will later invent) is perhaps the first attempt at a philosophy that 
radically and insistently challenges the assumed priority of conceptual architectures and 
networks of meaning over the effects of language (both intralinguistic and interlingual). 
This rather complex intellectual history converges, perhaps unsurprisingly, on the 
figure of Walter Benjamin, whose celebrated translations of the Tableaux Parisiens section of 
Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal led to his even more celebrated essay on translation, ‘Die 
Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, which originally served as an introduction to this translation. 
Derrida wrote at length on this essay,18 but I would like to turn to a contemporary of Derrida, 
                                                          
18 Jacques Derrida, Des Tours de Babel, trans. by Joseph Graham, in Difference in 
Translation, ed. by Joseph Graham (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 165–
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Paul de Man, and his reading of Benjamin’s text, originally delivered as a lecture at Cornell 
University in 1983, which at the same time completes something of a circle back to 
Gadamer.19 The lecture was the last in a series of six he delivered at Cornell, in which he read 
key texts by a number of the important German philosophers — notably Kant, Hegel, and 
Schiller — and tested the overt conceptual claims made by these philosophers against what 
the texts revealed through rhetorical close reading. De Man starts his discussion of Benjamin 
with a reference to Gadamer’s articulation of those aspects of the subject of modernity which 
set it apart from the transcendental subject of German idealism. In a series of essays, Aspekte 
der Modernität, published originally in 1960, and in particular one article, ‘Die 
philosophischen Grundlagen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts,’ Gadamer says that our 
modernity is in essence characterized by a critique of the subject and subjectivity in its 
various forms, and the means whereby this has been accomplished has taken the form of 
going beyond three different types of ‘naiveté’. Firstly what Gadamer terms Naivität des 
Setzens, insofar as our modern subject, given the various ways in which it has been 
decentered by advances in understanding in psychoanalysis, anthropology, phenomenology, 
the neurosciences, and so on, is no longer able to fully posit (setzen) and dominate its own 
discourse, or the objective world.20 In Gadamer’s terms, what is lost is this decentering, and 
the blindness of the subject to its own discourse, can be recovered by the dialogical process 
that is the hermeneutic circle. Secondly, what Gadamer calls Naivität der Reflexion: we now 
have a much greater understanding of the historicity of understanding, which will lead in turn 
to a fully developed Aesthetics of Reception by theorists such as Hans Robert Jauss. And 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
248. Jacques Derrida, ‘What is a “Relevant” Translation?’, trans. by Lawrence Venuti, 
Critical Inquiry 17 (2001), pp. 174–200. 
19 Paul de Man, ‘On Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”’, in The Resistance to 
Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp. 73–105. 
20 de Man, ‘On Walter Benjamin’, p. 75. 
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finally, Naivität des Begriffs: modernity no longer thinks of conceptual and ordinary language 
as separable, or rather the advance that modernity has made over a Hegelian spiritualizing 
dialectical negation is that philosophy is increasingly focused on language, communication, 
and the place of the reader within the hermeneutic circle.  
This presentation of Gadamer’s understanding of philosophical modernity initially 
provides de Man with an enlightened contrast to Benjamin’s apparently naïve, messianic, 
regressive language in his discussion of the place of translation and the translator in relation 
to the original work of art. This is nowhere more evident than in the famous opening lines of 
Benjamin’s text, where the cryptic dismissal of the reader, or receiver, could not be further 
from Gadamer’s own insistence on the central role of the reader in any philosophical or 
literary hermeneutics: 
 
Nirgends erweist sich einem Kunstwerk oder einer Kunstform gegenüber die 
Rücksicht auf den Aufnehmenden für deren Erkenntnis fruchtbar. Nicht genug, daß 
jede Beziehung auf ein bestimmtes Publikum oder dessen Repräsentanten vom Wege 
abführt, ist sogar der Begriff eines ‘idealen’ Aufnehmenden in allen 
kunsttheoretischen Erörterungen vom Übel, weil diese lediglich gehalten sind, Dasein 
und Wesen des Menschen überhaupt vorauszusetzen. So setzt auch die Kunst selbst 
dessen leibliches und geistiges Wesen voraus – seine Aufmerksamkeit aber in keinem 
ihrer Werke. Denn kein Gedicht gilt dem Leser, kein Bild dem Beschauer, keine 
Symphonie der Hörerschaft.21 
 
                                                          
21 Walter Benjamin, ‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’ (1923), in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by 
Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1972–
1989), IV.1, 9. 
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Paul de Man argues that Benjamin understands with great lucidity how radically disruptive 
translation is to hermeneutic assumptions about language and communication, and indeed to 
the received understanding of the priority of original over translation in a literary context. 
The key tension de Man turns to in order to exemplify this in Benjamin’s text is the 
distinction he makes between ‘das Gemeinte’ (or le vouloir-dire, in French), that is, what is 
meant or intended) and the ‘Art des Meinens’ (le dire) or the linguistic or rhetorical means by 
which one conveys that intention.22 More than simply a statement about the arbitrary nature 
of the signifier over against the signified, what it reveals is a radical incompatibility between 
the way language functions, independently of human intention (this is de Man’s reading of 
the opening lines of Benjamin’s essay quoted earlier), and the way a subject (whether 
phenomenological, transcendental, or political) can articulate that meaning or intention in 
linguistic terms, a disjunction which could be formulated, as he says, ‘between the 
hermeneutics and the poetics of literature’.23 As de Man puts it: 
 
When you do hermeneutics, you are concerned with the meaning of the work; when 
you do poetics, you are concerned with the stylistics or with the description of the 
way in which a work means. The question is whether these two are complementary, 
whether you can cover the full work by doing hermeneutics and poetics at the same 
time. The experience of trying to do this shows that it is not the case. When one tries 
to achieve this complementarity, the poetics always drops out, and what one always 
does is hermeneutics. One is so attracted by problems of meaning that it is impossible 
to do hermeneutics and poetics at the same time. From the moment you start to get 
involved with problems of meaning, as I unfortunately tend to do, forget about the 
                                                          
22 de Man, ‘On Walter Benjamin’, p. 86. 
23 de Man, ‘On Walter Benjamin’, p. 88. 
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poetics. The two are not complementary, the two may be mutually exclusive in a 
certain way, and that is part of the problem which Benjamin states, a purely linguistic 
problem.24 
 
De Man articulates this incompatibility elsewhere in a number of different ways (for 
example, the tension between syntax and semantics, or between rhetoric as trope and rhetoric 
as persuasion).25 His reading of Gadamer’s hermeneutics would thus echo Derrida’s own, to 
take us back to the Heidelberg conference we began with, and exemplifies the difference 
between the two different modes of critical reading, hermeneutics and deconstruction. It is 
clearer now why the two are perhaps inevitably destined to be at odds, and are perhaps yet 
another in a series of inherently incompatible tensions which de Man teases out in his 
discussion of Benjamin, and in his other works. What translation does, as Benjamin 
understood, is to lay bare the these tensions, precisely because language acts independently of 
human intention, and yet these unintended interlingual effects, as we have seen with the 
Dictionary of Untranslatables, can have very real political and philosophical consequences.  
It also provides a broader context to think about the place of translation within 
modern Europe. One might say that the subject of philosophical modernity is inextricably 
bound up with the history and self-constitution of Europe as such, that is, not only the 
Enlightenment and democratic ideals which have shaped Europe’s political modernity, but 
also Europe as a subject, in its capacity to think and represent itself. The Dictionary of 
Untranslatables began life in its French original — Dictionnaire européen des philosophies 
— as a project whose centre of gravity was, for evident reasons, European. It was also from 
                                                          
24 de Man, ‘On Walter Benjamin’, p. 88. 
25 The most fully developed examples of de Man’s rhetorically-inflected deconstructive 
readings are to be found in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, 
Rilke and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). 
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the outset a profoundly political project, exploring the foundational origins of political 
philosophy in the city-state in Ancient Greece, and including many entries which address this 
explicitly, for example, ‘Polis’, ‘Politics’, ‘Civilization’, ‘Civil Rights’, ‘Community’, 
‘Government’, ‘Lex’, ‘Liberty’, ‘Rule of Law’, ‘People’, ‘Race’, ‘Nation’, Stato’. It is also 
political because of the proliferating connections now emerging out of the translation of the 
Dictionary into other languages. The effect of this is to shift the focus away from Europe, or 
from Europe as a kind of philosophical headland, as Derrida might say, towards postcolonial 
perspectives, and more importantly, non-European languages, This can be seen in the case of 
the Arabic edition, in which Ali Benmakhlouf, the editor, maintains an explicit focus on 
political terms such as ‘People’, ‘Law’ and ‘State’, and challenges contemporary shallow 
understandings of terms such as ‘Sharia’, as a means to professionalize the act of translation 
itself in the Arab world. As Cassin points out, the most intense historical pressure points in 
terms of the relationship of politics to language occur, not surprisingly, during times of 
political upheaval and trauma, of which she provides a number of poignant examples, but the 
need for attention to translation, for this very reason, has never been more urgent than it is 
today.26 Derrida says much the same in The Other Headland in the early 1990s, another 
‘today’ (recalling Valéry’s ‘today’ of 1939, itself echoing other resonant ‘todays’ in 
European philosophy and culture of the past), in the process challenging the self-evidence by 
which Europe claims its own philosophical and political identity. This is not in any sense to 
be confused with contemporary forms of anti-Europeanism or Euroscepticism, since 
Derrida’s argument, entirely consonant with the logic of the ‘Untranslatables’ project, is that 
to think Europe — in the past, present, and future — requires a double affirmation of Europe 
                                                          
26 See Barbara Cassin, ‘Entre’ in Eloge de la traduction: compliquer l’universel (Paris: 
Fayard, 2016), pp. 227–39.  
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and its other, simultaneously holding on to its most cherished political ideals, and leaving it 
open to a radical otherness: 
 
it is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of 
Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own 
identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not, toward the 
other heading, or the heading of the other, indeed — and this is perhaps something 
else altogether — toward the other of the heading, which would be the beyond of this 
modern tradition, another border structure, another shore.27 
 
In a broad discussion that has taken in Gadamer, Derrida, Heidegger, Benjamin, de Man and 
Cassin, I have argued that Franco-German philosophical relations are very much at the heart 
of Europe’s modernity. Within this perspective, translation plays a central if radically 
decentring role, and as Cassin’s ‘Untranslatables’ project demonstrates, it allows for a far 
more nuanced understanding of the past, present and future of Europe and its others, or the 
other of Europe, as a self-constituting subject of modernity. What Europe as a political and 
economic project may look like in ten or twenty years’ time is anyone’s guess, but a strong 
relationship between France and Germany is clearly still central to that future. I would 
contend that as long as that relationship holds, and the kinds of philosophical exchanges it has 
produced continue, we have good reason to hope. 
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